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In today's global economy, it is not unlikely that an
entrepreneurial inventor may work in the United States and service
customers from around the world. Such an inventor is faced with
an assortment of international legal concerns including shipping,
tariffs, and customs. Additionally, such an inventor would have to
manage the concerns that surround the patenting process: filing,
novelty, usefulness, and the on-sale bar, to name a few. What
happens when contracts for sale are formed with foreign
customers? What happens when domestic patent law runs squarely
into a product that is marketed and sold not only in the United
States, but around the world? What source of law should be
consulted to determine the body of law that governs when
domestic law overlaps with international customs or treaties?
The modern inventor is compelled to create innovative
products, generate a market for those products, and protect those
products with a patent. The choice to file a patent application
reflects an inventor's desire to protect her private interest in
controlling a limited monopoly over the invention, subject to the
statutes governing patents. Section 102 of the 1952 Patent Act 2
attempts to balance such private interests with the goal of
increasing the pool of public knowledge. Specifically, § 102 states
"[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... the invention
was.., on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date
of the application for patent in the United States." This particular
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005.
2 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004).
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provision of the Patent Act is known as the "on-sale bar." The
Supreme Court in Pfaffv. Wells Electronics, Inc.3 stated that the
critical date for the on-sale bar is triggered when the invention is
both ready for patenting and the "subject of a commercial offer for
sale. 'A Appearing simple on its surface, § 102 can be the source of
deep and complex inquiry into what actions constitute a
"commercial offer for sale.",5 In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") attempted to simplify this
inquiry by holding that courts should look to Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") to determine whether a
commercial offer for sale has occurred.6
On May 13, 2003, the American Law Institute ("ALI"),
authors of the UCC, finalized its revisions of UCC Article 2.
7
Faced with two versions of Article 2, the Federal Circuit
eventually will be forced to decide whether to rely on the new
version of Article 2 or continue to use the older version of Article
2. This comment will argue that instead of relying on either
version of Article 2, the Federal Circuit should look to the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods ("CISG") 8 to determine whether a commercial offer for sale
has occurred in actions under § 102(b).
II. Development of § 102(b) On-Sale Bar Interpretation
The on-sale bar is essentially a one-year statute of
limitations for filing a patent application. 9 Once an inventor offers
an invention for sale within the United States, the inventor has one
year to file the patent.' 0 After the year expires, the United States
3 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
4 Id. at 67.
5id.
6 See Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
7 See Uniform Law Commissioners, Work Concludes on Uniform Commercial
Code Articles 2 and 2A, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopModules/
NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=51 (May 14, 2003) [hereinafter ULC] (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
8 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.9 7/18 (1980) [hereinafter CISG].
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Patent and Trademark Office will not issue a patent for the
invention.'1 Thus, § 102(b) indicates that there are two critical
analyses to be performed: (1) whether an inventor has offered an
invention for sale in this country and (2) whether the offer for sale
occurred more than one year prior to the filing of the patent. 12 As
a result, in on-sale bar actions the Federal Circuit must frequently
examine the nature of an inventor's actions more than one year
prior to the filing date to determine if the actions rise to the level of
an offer for sale.
Since the formation of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme
Court has rarely granted certiorari to a case involving a substantive
patent issue, leaving the Federal Circuit with almost exclusive
jurisdiction over substantive patent issues.1 3 As a result, the
Federal Circuit has established itself as the "preeminen[t] [court] in
the patent community"' 4 and perhaps the "world's most influential
patents court. ' 5 Accordingly, when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Pfaff, some commentators interpreted the Court's
action as a managerial maneuver to provide more oversight to
Federal Circuit decisions regarding substantive patent law.'
6
Before Pfaff, the Federal Circuit's interpretation of
§ 102(b) had evolved into a "totality of the circumstances" test to
determine whether a particular set of actions constituted an offer
for sale sufficient to trigger the § 102(b) statute of limitations.17





13 Following the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to only three cases that address substantive patent issues. See
Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REv. 387, 388 n.2 (2001). Some commentators have noted that the
Supreme Court's notable absence in discerning substantive patent law has
allowed the Federal Circuit to "anoint itself a de facto court of last resort in
patents." Id. at 402.
14 Janis, supra note 13, at 404.
15 1d.16 Id. at 409-11.
17 See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(citing W. Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840 (Fed. Cir.
1985)). Courts often weighed the level of completion of the invention, or the
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The test included an assessment of whether the invention had been
reduced to practice or what level of completion the invention had
attained when commercial sale activities were commenced.'0
Thus, when the Federal Circuit decided Pfaff, it applied the well-
established totality of the circumstances test.19 The Supreme Court
reversed, stating the invention's relative level of completion may
be informative but is not determinative of whether the on-sale bar
has been triggered. 20 The Supreme Court established the current
two-part test requiring that the invention be both "the subject of a
"on hand" test, as heavily as the activities surrounding the actual offer for sale or
"on-sale activities" when determining § 102(b) cases. See McCreery Eng'g Co.
v. Mass. Fan Co., 195 F. 498 (1st Cir. 1917). Later, the Second Circuit
established a new three-part test for determining whether the on-sale bar was
triggered by the inventor's activities. See Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523
F.2d 288, 302 (2d Cir. 1975).
18 See, e.g., Timely Prods., 523 F.2d at 302. Reduction to practice is a term of
art among patent practitioners and refers to the legal determination that an
invention has both a physical embodiment as well as the ability to achieve its
intended purpose. Commentators note that several factors are considered when
determining if an invention has been reduced to practice, including whether
there is a physical or tangible embodiment, whether the physical embodiment
includes each feature claimed in the patent, the practicability or utility to an
individual skilled in the pertinent art, and whether the inventor understands that
the invention has been reduced to practice. See William C. Rooklidge & W.
Gerhard von Hoffman, III, Reduction to Practice, Experimental Use, and the
"On Sale" and "Public Use" Bars to Patentability, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 7-
8 (1988) (citing 1 C. RJVISE & A. CAESAR, INTERFERENCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 132 (1940)).
'9 See Pfaffv. Wells Elecs. Inc., 124 F.3d 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[I]n
making the determination as to whether the invention was 'on sale,' '[a]ll of the
circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to sell, including the stage of
development of the invention and the nature of the invention, must be
considered and weighed against the policies underlying section 102(b)."'
(quoting Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544
(Fed. Cir. 1997))).
20 See Pfaff V. Wells Elecs. Inc, 525 U.S. 55, 60 ("The primary meaning of the
word 'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's
conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea. The statute does
not contain any express requirement that an invention must be reduced to
practice before it can be patented.").
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commercial offer for sale" and "ready for patenting" before the on-
sale bar's critical date.
21
While the new standard was relatively easy to apply to the
facts in Pfaff,22 this standard was indefinite and provided no
guidance to the lower courts as to exactly what would constitute a
commercial offer for sale.23 However, the Federal Circuit
provided guidance in 2001 in Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards,
24Inc., pointing out that Pfaff"suggest[ed] that the offer must meet
the level of an offer in the contract sense." 25 Group One held that
courts applying § 102(b) should "look to the Uniform Commercial
Code ('UCC') to define whether, as in this case, a communication
or series of communications rises to the level of a commercial
offer for sale."
26
The Federal Circuit explained its election to use the UCC,
stating that the UCC is widely accepted as the "general law
governing the sale of goods., 27 However, the Federal Circuit also
recognized that while the UCC is a "useful" tool in determining
whether certain communications rise to the level of a commercial
2 1 Id. at 67.
22 The Supreme Court explained that the circumstances in Pfaffmade it easy to
determine that the § 102(b) bar had been triggered because the inventor's
activities fulfilled the "on-sale" and "ready for patenting" requirements of the
test. First, the inventor had accepted a purchase order for his invention, a clear
indication that a commercial offer for sale had been made. Second, the inventor
had sent drawings to the purchaser that fully disclosed the invention, an activity
that, while insufficient to indicate reduction to practice, was affirmative proof
that "the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention
that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the
invention." Id.
23 See Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("[T]he [Supreme] Court did not elaborate on what was meant by 'a
commercial offer for sale."'); see also Isabelle R. McAndrews, The On-Sale Bar
After Pfaff v. Wells Electronics: Toward a Bright-Line Rule, 81 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 155, 161-64 (outlining the ambiguity inherent in the
Supreme Court's test, as opposed to the former "totality of the circumstances
test").
24 254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001).25 Id. at 1046; see also Susan Knoll & Jon Pierce, Prior Art Under 35 U.S. C.
§ 102(b), 756 PLIfPAT 11, 14-16 (2003).
26 Group One, 254 F.3d at 1047.
2 7 id.
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offer for sale, it is not an "authoritative" source. 28 The court's
reservation in the Group One holding opened the door for federal
district courts to look to other sources for aid in judging
commercial sale activities. 29 The actions of the district courts,
combined with the Federal Circuit's hesitancy to declare the UCC
the unequivocal authority regarding what constitutes a commercial
offer for sale, indicates some uncertainty as to whether the UCC
will or should remain the standard. This uncertainty, when
coupled with the recent release of a new version of UCC Article 2,
creates an ideal opportunity to consider implementing the clearer
standard found in the CISG.
III. Which UCC Article 2?
As the Federal Circuit was deciding to look to the UCC in
Group One, the ALI was simultaneously preparing amendments
and revisions to UCC Article 2. Thus, as the Federal Circuit was
indicating that the UCC would be considered a "useful" tool for
evaluating whether certain communications rise to the level of a
commercial offer for sale, 30 the ALI was already amending the
very document that it was relying upon. In retrospect, the timing
of these two events had the ironic effect of creating the possibility
of even greater uncertainty in an area that the Federal Circuit
sought to clarify.
28 Id. at 1047-48. Subsequent Federal Circuit opinions have reiterated that the
UCC is still a guide for determining whether the on-sale bar has been triggered.
See, e.g., Lachs Indus. Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322
F.3d 1335, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
29 The Federal Court for the District of Delaware consulted several contract
treatises including the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Williston on
Contracts to find a definition of offer for sale. MLMC, Ltd. v. Airtouch
Communications Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 464, 477 (D. Del. 2002), appeal
dismissed by 54 Fed. Appx. 328 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
30 Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
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A. Overview of Old Article 2
UCC Article 2 originates from a joint initiative between the
National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") and the ALI in the 1940s. The objective was to
increase certainty and consistency in a growing national
commercial system.3' The UCC was intended to address a
particular subset of contract law known as "sales law," or the
regulation of the exchange of goods for a price as between
32parties. Sales law is a creation of statutory law, as opposed to
common law, and for domestic sales transactions, the UCC is the
primary source of domestic statutory law.33 As a result of the
UCC's preeminence, Article 2 has been adopted and enacted with
some modifications by every state except Louisiana.
34
Additionally, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have
also enacted the UCC in their statutory regimes.
35
UCC Article 2 applies to sales or "transactions in goods,"
36
and its rules are based upon a general survey of statutory law and
sales practices.37 However, Article 2 does not attempt to displace
all prior sales concepts. 38 Instead, remnants of the common law
rules can be found in specific provisions of Article 2.39 Generally,
Article 2 expands the concept of a contract from traditional
31 See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL 1 (Rev'd ed. 2002); see also Peter B. Maggs, The Effect of
Proposed Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, at
http://home.law.uiuc.edu/-pmaggs/ucc.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
32 See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 31, at 1.
33 Id.
34 Id. Links to the versions of UCC Article 2 as adopted by the various states are
available online. See Legal Information Institute, Uniform Commercial Code
Locator, at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a2 (Mar. 24, 2003)
[hereinafter UCC Locator] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
35 See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 31, at 1; see also UCC Locator.
36 See U.C.C. § 2-201 (2003).
37 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 1 (5th ed. 2000).
38 See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 31, at 54-55.
" See id. at 54.
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common law notions. 4u The crucial provision of Article 2 is
§ 2-204, which governs the formation of contracts. Under § 2-204,
a contract for the sale of goods may be formed in any way that
indicates the parties' intent to form a contract.41 Thus, conduct of
the two parties may be sufficient to form a contract as opposed to
the common law requirement of a formal exchange of offer and
acceptance.42 Allowing the conduct of the parties to serve as a
formative instrument relaxes the formality of forming a contract by
focusing more on the agreement than the actual offer and
acceptance.43
Article 2 also relaxes the requirements for formation 44 by
allowing a written instrument to "indicate" that a contract exists
even if the terms are incomplete 45 and by loosening the
requirements for a proper acceptance of an offer.4 6 The drafters of
Article 2 relaxed these requirements because it was believed that
40 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, §§ 1-2. The UCC allows the use of
common law principles to supplement the UCC's provisions. See U.C.C. § 1-
103(b). However, such common law principles may not "supplant" the
provisions of the UCC unless otherwise indicated by a particular provision. See
U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2. The ultimate effect is that common law rules that are
different from the UCC's model are superceded while common law rules that
are consistent with the UCC supplement the UCC. This can be problematic,
because often questions arise regarding which common law rules are displaced
and which will supplement. See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 31, at 46.
41 U.C.C. § 2-204(a)(1) ("A contract for sale of goods may be made in any
manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract.").
42 See id.
43 See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 31, at 47.
44 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, §§ 1-2.
41 See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) ("[A] contract for the sale of goods ... is not
enforceable ... unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract
for sale has been made .... A writing is not insufficient because it omits or
incorrectly states a term agreed upon.").
46 See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) ("[A]n offer to make a contract shall be construed as
inviting acceptance in any manner and by anymedium reasonable in the
circumstances."); see also U.C.C. § 2-207 ("A definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a
reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional
to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.").
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"commercial parties were in a better position than judges or
legislators to determine socially desirable commercial
arrangements., 47 As a result, Article 2 reflects private rules and
practices that developed between merchants. 48 The drafters also
intended for courts to construe the provisions of Article 2 liberally
so that courts might accommodate changes in commercial practices
as they evolve over time. 49 Relaxing the formation requirements
allows the UCC to keep pace with commercial practices and eases
the process of bargaining for the sale of goods. However, it also
makes Article 2 difficult to apply to issues that generally surround
on-sale bar cases because of the inherent required certainty that is
necessary when determining exactly if and when an offer for sale
has been made.
B. New Article 2
Revised Article 2 was first approved by the NCCUSL in
late summer 2002 and was approved by the ALl at its 80th Annual
Meeting in May 2003.50 The amendments are the culmination of
an effort that began in the early 1980s51 and were intended to
"accommodate electronic commerce and to reflect development of
business practices, changes in other law and interpretive
difficulties of practical significance.,
52
47 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 31, at 1.
48 id.
4 91 d. at 3.
50 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
2003 AMENDMENTS: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2-SALES: A
SUMMARY, 1 (2004) [hereinafter NCCUSL Summary].
51 Id.
52 Uniform Law Commissioners, supra note 7. The drafters of amended Article
2 explored a number of options for achieving the goal of an updated version.
Initial considerations included integrating Article 2 into an article having a
scope much broader than simply the sale of goods. Other issues regarding the
substantive changes were also addressed, despite the fact that Article 2 was
widely regarded as a very useful tool. Eventually, only "discrete amendments"
to particular sections that would address modem commercial sales issues were
chosen as the most appropriate course of action. See NCCUSL Summary, supra
note 50, at 1.
The intent of the amendments was to allow "basic Article 2
[to] remain sacrosanct ' 53 while updating Article 2 into a uniform
code that remains applicable to modem business practices.
54
Amendments to Article 2 with regard to electronic commerce
include the replacement of the term "writing" with "record" and
the use of "new [definitional] terms [such as] 'electronic,'
'electronic agent,' and 'electronic record."' 55 Additionally,
amendments to § 2-204 included changes to account for sales and
interactions between "electronic agents or the interaction of an
individual and an electronic agent." 56 New § 2-211 provides that
an electronic form of a "record, or signature may not be denied
legal effect or enforceability solely because it is electronic in
form.",57 The intent behind new § 2-211 is to "eliminate the
element of medium as a reason to deny enforceability to a record,
signature or contract., 58 Additionally, new § 2-212 establishes that
an electronic signature is attributable to a person, and new § 2-213
states "if receipt of an electronic communication has legal effect,
the effect is not changed merely because no individual is aware of
the receipt."59 Although the new version of Article 2 has not yet
been adopted by any state, 60 as the revisions gain broader
acceptance the changes to Article 2 may have a significant impact
upon determining the critical date under § 102(b) since electronic
53 NCCUSL Summary, supra note 50, at 1.54 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
PREFATORY NOTE, AMENDMENT TO UCC ARTICLE 2, 1 (2003) [hereinafter
NCCUSL Prefatory Note].
55 Id.
56 Id. Such changes are intended to accommodate purchases made from online
catalogues and the like.
57 C. ROBERT BEATTIE, MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO UCC ARTICLE 2, 9 (2003) at http://www2.mnbar.org/sections/
business-law/ucc-handouts.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law
& Technology); see also NCCUSL Prefatory Note, supra note 54, at 1.
58 BEATIE, supra note 57, at 10.59 NCCUSL Prefatory Note, supra note 54, at 1-2. Such a change can be
interpreted to mean that the time an e-mail is received into an e-mail client's
"inbox" will serve as the time of receipt, even if the recipient has not yet opened
or is unaware of the e-mail.
60 See UCC Locator, supra note 34. None of the versions of the UCC that have
been adopted by the States reflect the new amendments to Article 2. Id.
360 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 5
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transmissions and communications are now on par with traditional
written correspondence.
IV. Enter the CISG
The CISG was the result of a sixty-year effort by various
international organizations to develop a single uniform convention
to govern the international sale of goods.61 After years of
predecessor conventions and treaties, the CISG was finalized in
April 1980 and became effective on January 1, 1988, as a "self-
executing Convention." 62 Generally, the CISG governs contracts
for the sale of goods, and is applicable when the contract is made
between parties who have different states as their respective places
of business.63 The CISG does not specifically define the terms
"contract" or "goods," but other provisions within the CISG
implicitly define the terms.64 As of the time of publication of this
61 See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 1 (Gregory Thomas, trans., Clarendon
Press, 2d ed. 1998).
62 Id. at 2-3. A self-executing convention or treaty is an instrument that does not
require an action by a state's legislative body to give the instrument the power to
bind the state under the provisions of the instrument. Such action would be
codification of the treaty or conventions provisions into the state's statutory
regime. See BARRY E. CARTER, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 168-69 (4th ed.
2003) (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)).
63 See CISG, supra note 8, art. 1(1); see also SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 61, at
21 7. It is important to note that the CISG governs only when the places of
business for both parties are in contracting states. Contracting states are only
those states that have ratified or accede to the CISG. Furthermore, a contracting
state may have made declarations that limit or render inapplicable some
provisions of the CISG. See id. at 25 32.
64 While the CISG does not explicitly define the term "contract," its meaning
can be inferred from the terms of Article 30, which defines the obligations of the
seller, and Article 53, which defines the obligations of the buyer. Under these
provisions a contract for sale requires one party to deliver goods, while another
party is required to pay for the goods and "co-operate in the manner required by
the contract." SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 61, at 22 14. Goods under the CISG
are considered only "moveable, tangible objects." Id. at 23 20. Article 2
provides an exclusionary rule, enumerating items that the CISG does not
address. See CISG, supra note 8, art. 2.
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article, sixty-two countries including the United States were party
to the CISG.65
The CISG closely resembles the UCC in a number of
respects, but the documents are also different in significant ways.
The CISG is organized into four parts, with the second part dealing
specifically with the formation of contracts. 66 CISG Articles 14
through 24 establish contract formation rules in accord with
"'traditional theory,' using 'offer' and 'acceptance' as the elements
through which agreement between the parties is created., 67 The
concepts of offer and acceptance are "ideas common to all legal
systems, 68 including the UCC. But the CISG also allows for
formation absent offer and acceptance, since Article 9(1) allows
incorporation of the practices that parties have adopted in their
own courses of business. 69 As a result, the business practices of
the parties may operate to form a contract for the sale of goods
even if the traditional standards of offer and acceptance are not
used. However, for such practices to bind the parties to an
agreement there must "be an implied agreement that a usage will
be binding on the parties."70 Two additional conditions surround
such practices, the first being that the practices must be the kind
"of which the parties knew or ought to have known," and it must
also be a practice "which in international trade is widely known to,
65 See CISG: Table of Contracting States, at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
countries/cntries.html (Feb. 20, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
66 Part I deals with the scope of the CISG and provides general rules, Part III
addresses the "substantive rules of the sales contract," providing for remedies
and obligations of the parties, and Part IV addresses the "final public
international law provisions." SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 61, at 3. Part II is
comprised of Articles 14 through 24.
67 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 61, at 99 2.
68 See id.
69 CISG, supra note 8, art. 9(1) ("The parties are bound by any usage to which
they have agreed and by any practices which they have established between
themselves.").
70 Guide to CISG Article 9, Secretariat Commentary, at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-09.html (last updated
Mar. 19, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved
in the particular trade concerned.",
7
'
Although the CISG might appear similar to the UCC by
allowing formation absent express offer and acceptance, the UCC
allows the use of any conduct by the parties that indicates an
agreement or contract.72 Under the CISG, the practices must be
specifically followed or adopted by the parties in their normal
course of business. While the UCC focuses more on the agreement
between the parties to determine contract formation, the CISG
places greater emphasis on the formal instruments of offer and
acceptance.73 In other words, the CISG tends to draw more narrow
distinctions between contractual and non-contractual behavior than
the UCC does.74
The articles that have the most bearing on the sale of goods
are found in CISG Part II. Specifically, Article 14 provides that "a
proposal for concluding a contract... constitutes an offer if it is
sufficiently definite and indicates the intention of the offeror to be
bound in case of acceptance., 75 Article 14 goes on to provide the
minimum elements for sufficiency, thus precisely and specifically
outlining what shall be considered an offer for sale under the
CISG.76 Accordingly, any communication between parties that
does not rise to the level of the minimum elements is not an offer
under the CISG unless the parties have mutually adopted another
practice for concluding a contract.77 This differs from the UCC's
prescription that a contract may be formed "in any manner
sufficient to show agreement," 78 even if certain elements are
omitted or left open.79 Furthermore, the CISG's focus on the
71 id.
72 U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 207(3) (2003) (providing that any conduct of the parties may
be used to deduce a contract or agreement).
73 See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 31, at 47.
74 See id.
75 CISG, supra note 8, art. 14(1).
76 See id. ("A proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and
expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and
the price [of the goods]."); see also SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 61, at 105 2.
77 See CISG, supra note 8, art. 9(1).
78 See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2003).79 See U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
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contents, rather than form, of the communication allows the CISG
to keep pace with evolving commercial practices without the need
for review and revision, unlike the UCC, where specific
amendments were introduced to address electronic transmission of
contractual instruments.
8 0
Perhaps the most significant deficiency in using Article 2
as a standard for determining the critical date under the on-sale bar
is the fact that UCC Article 2 states "an agreement sufficient to
constitute a contract may be found even though the moment of its
making is undetermined.",8' This provision serves to undermine
the utility of the UCC in determining an offer for sale under
§ 102(b) because a court could find an offer for sale without being
able to determine when the offer was made. Under § 102(b),
identifying the time at which an inventor's actions occur is equally
82
as important as identifying the nature of those activities.
The specificity with which the CISG has been drafted will
eliminate this ambiguity. Article 14 requires that a proposal be
"sufficiently definite." 83 Article 15 specifically addresses when an
offer for sale is effective, stating that the offer is effective when
received by the offeree. 84 Thus, Article 14 and Article 15 work in
concert to determine when an offer for sale has been made. The
CISG's specificity in this area would provide far better utility and
guidance to the Federal Circuit in determining the critical date for
the on-sale bar.
While the revised Article 2 has been amended to
accommodate developing commercial practices such as the use of
email and other forms of electronic commerce,85 the CISG has not
80 Compare CISG, supra note 8, art. 14(1), with BEATTY, supra note 57, at 9.
81 See U.C.C. § 2-204(2).
82 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004). Section 102(b) addresses both an inventor's
activities and the time at which those activities occur, indicating that both
components are equally significant in establishing the critical date for the on-
sale bar. Id.
83 CISG, supra note 8, art. 14(1).
84CISG, supra note 8, art. 15(1) ("An offer becomes effective when it reaches
the offeree.").
85 See NCCUSL Summary, supra note 50, at 1.
SPRING 2004] ON-SALE BAR 365
been amended in a similar fashion. 86 Commentators have
lamented that the fact the CISG was drafted over twenty years ago
may render it a hindrance to commercial activities in the modem
87commercial environment . Despite its apparent obsolescence, the
CISG addressed the commercial state of the art at the time it was
drafted. Specifically, Article 13 of the CISG allows for a telegram
or telex to suffice as a "writing." 88 The CISG does not specifically
address email or other emerging commercial practices, but
commentators have noted that Article 13 should be read broadly so
as to "include all electronic forms of communication." 89 Such an
interpretation of Article 13 would assure that the CISG will remain
relevant in the context of an international commercial system that
increasingly relies on electronic communications.
The UCC attempts to reduce formalities involved in
contract formation,90 a proposition that may be helpful to parties
contracting for the commercial sale of goods. But this standard
creates more difficulty for both courts and the parties before the
courts in precisely determining when a commercial offer for sale
sufficient to implicate the on-sale bar has been made. In contrast,
application of the CISG's more rigid formalities would eliminate a
86 The CISG could be amended, however the process for amending a
multinational treaty can be fraught with complications. Parties to multinational
treaties or agreements wishing to make amendments may do so by an agreement
with certain other parties. Additionally, amendments or modifications may be
made among all parties, so long as all parties to the original agreement are given
the opportunity to participate in the amendment negotiations. Such
requirements can render the amendment process a difficult and frustrating
endeavor. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 334
(1987).
87 See Siegfried Eiselen, Electronic Commerce and the UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980), 6 EDI LAW R. 21, 21
(1999), available at http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/eiselenl .html (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
88 CISG, supra note 8, art. 13 ("For the purposes of this Convention 'writing'
includes telegram or telex.").
89 See Eiselen, supra note 87, at 36 ("A fax, e-mail or EDI message should be
regarded as a writing where writing is required."). But see SCHLECHTRIEM,
supra note 61, at 94 2 (stating that in the author's opinion, electronic
communications that can not printed in hard copy form will not constitute a
"writing").
90 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, §§ 1-2.
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great deal of uncertainty regarding whether an offer for sale has
been made because if the offeror's communication does not
contain the minimum elements, no offer can be found from the
terms of the instrument.
V. The Case for the CISG
In addition to the CISG's requirements of a higher level of
precision when making an offer for sale, there are other compelling
reasons why the CISG is a good option for the Federal Circuit to
evaluate as a new standard for the § 102(b) on-sale bar.
A. International Standards
Commentators have noted that recent developments have
brought the United States' intellectual property law into closer
conformity with international standards. Such commentators often
refer to this trend as international harmonization. 91 There is some
utility in international harmonization because the differences in the
laws of the various nations often create difficulty. If the laws of
one nation starkly contrast with the laws of its neighbors, the result
is a "disharmony" that can create "trade barriers and friction at
both the private and diplomatic level., 92 Efforts to bring U.S.
intellectual property law into closer conformity with European and
international standards have been met with a great deal of political
resistance,93 but incremental changes have been made.94 These
91 "Harmonization" is a term that is frequently employed to describe the process
of bringing standardization to the legal regimes of separate and distinct nations.
See Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now-The Case for Patent
Harmonization, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 291, 291 n.1 (1995).
92 Donald D. Chisum, The Harmonization of International Patent Law, 26 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 437, 437 (1993).
93 See id.
94 See id. International harmonization in the area of patent law has met a great
deal of resistance. Scholars have argued that efforts to bring U.S. patent law
into close conformity with international standards are merely a concession to
corporations while placing small or individual inventors at a distinct
disadvantage. Despite such contention, specific changes have been made in the
area of patent law and include the extension of patent protection from a
changes signal an acknowledgement by Congress that incremental
adjustment of United States patent law toward similarity with
European and international laws has some domestic value.
Furthermore, the recent emergence of a more global economy
closely resembles the growth of the national economy that
propelled the efforts to standardize sales law under the UCC in the
1940s.95 In such an environment, it may be beneficial for the
Federal Circuit to consider an international standard for
commercial sales and contracts when evaluating the on-sale bar.
Admittedly, applying the CISG to domestic patent cases may
increase the complexity of the court's evaluation of an inventor's
commercial activities. In a domestic case involving both on-sale
bar and contract dispute issues, the inventor's commercial
activities would be subject to scrutiny under the CISG for the
patent issues as well as the UCC for the contractual issues.
96
While such redundancy might be viewed as inefficient and
cumbersome, the trade-off might be worthwhile considering the
formality that the CISG offers when examining commercial
activities to determine if and precisely when an offer for sale has
occurred.
B. United States Ratification of the CISG
The United States has ratified the CISG, giving the CISG
status as the preeminent instrument regarding the formation of
international sales contracts. Ratification was completed on
December 11, 1986, and the CISG entered into force on January 1,
seventeen to twenty year term and the publication of patent applications
eighteen months after the filing date, even if the patent has not yet issued. Id.
Additionally, prior to 1999, patent applications were kept absolutely confidential
until the patent issued. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1999) (amended by Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4502(a), 113 Stat. 1536
(1999)).
95 See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 31, at 1.
96 This situation only exists in a domestic commercial environment, because the
UCC governs domestic contracts. In an international commercial environment,
the CISG governs contractual activities, and thus the redundancy does not exist.
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1988. 97 Such action by the United States indicates that the CISG is
the "supreme law of the land" with regard to the international sale
of goods. 98 In the context of an increasingly global economy, the
CISG already governs actions taken by domestic inventors when
the inventor desires to sell her invention to a foreign purchaser.
Accordingly, federal courts may find it useful to consider the CISG
as an effective tool for determining whether an inventor's actions
also qualify as a commercial offer for sale under § 102(b) of the
Patent Act.
C. The CISG as a Better Standard Than the UCC
As the Federal Circuit stated in Group One, the UCC is a
"useful, though not authoritative, source in determining the...
meaning of the terms used by the parties [to an offer for sale]." 99
Such qualified language by the Federal Circuit may indicate that
the UCC, while providing a standard, does not provide perfect
guidance. The Federal Circuit's concern that it is often difficult to
determine "whether a set of interactions between parties constitutes
a commercial offer for sale," combined with its reluctance to
prescribe a bright line rule for identifying an offer for sale, indicate
that other authorities may be useful for addressing such questions
of whether an offer has been made.' 00 Indeed, the Federal Circuit
conceded that because the UCC does not actually define the term
"offer," the common law and secondary sources must be consulted
9' 15 U.S.C.A. app. (2003). The Constitution of the United States outlines the
proper form for ratification of a treaty, which requires action by the President,
upon the consent of a super-majority of the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.").
98 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 ("The Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States shall be the
supreme law of the Land.").
99 Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047-48 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
100 Id. at 1048.
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to both define the term and determine whether an action by an
inventor constitutes an offer.101
By contrast, the CISG is decidedly more precise in defining
what constitutes a commercial offer for sale than the UCC.1
0 2
While UCC Article 2 states that any actions "sufficient to show
agreement, including conduct by both parties" may be considered
when evaluating whether an offer and acceptance, the formative
instruments of a contract, have been made, 103 the CISG places far
more restrictive requirements on the parties' actions and
communications when concluding a contract. The CISG
specifically requires that a "proposal" be "sufficiently definite and
indicate[] the intention of the offeror to be bound in the case of
acceptance."' 0 4 The CISG even specifies the requirements for
sufficient definiteness, stating "a proposal is sufficiently definite if
it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes
provisions for determining the quantity and the price [of the
goods], ' 05 and indicates that the offer is effective when received
by the offeree. 10 6 Granted, the CISG does not explicitly define the
term "offer," but Article 14 implicitly indicates that when the
requisite elements are present in a proposal for concluding a
contract, the instrument will constitute an offer.'0 7 As a result, the
specificity with which the CISG has been drafted may ease the
difficulty in determining whether the actions of a party do indeed
constitute an offer for sale that the Federal Circuit identified in
Group One.
101 See Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("The UCC does not define 'offer' so we will look to the common law to guide
our inquiry."). The court goes on to cite the definitions of "offer" provided in
various secondary sources. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 24 (1981); 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 13 (4th ed. 1990)).
102 See CISG, supra note 8, art. 14(1); see also U.C.C. § 2-204 (2003).
103 U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
104 CISG, supra note 8, art. 14(1).
105 Id.
106 CISG, supra note 8, art. 15(1) ("An offer becomes effective when it reaches
the offeree.").
107 CISG, supra note 8, art. 14(1).
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VI. Conclusion
As the Federal Circuit continues to struggle with the
commercial offers for sale under § 102(b) of the Patent Act, it will
continue to look to the guidelines established by Pfaff, Group One,
and subsequent decisions. The Federal Circuit has indicated its
support for the UCC as a "'useful, though not authoritative, source
in determining the ordinary commercial meaning of terms used by
the parties,"'1 but the recent amendments to Article 2 include
changes to sections that are particularly important to the formation
of a contract, including offer for sale. As the new version of
Article 2 gains broader acceptance, the Federal Circuit will
encounter a dilemma. It will have to decide whether to use the
new version of Article 2 as its guide or to continue to apply the
current version. In light of this impending situation, and with
consideration for the recent trend toward international
harmonization of United States patent law, this would be a good
time for the Federal Circuit to consider the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as an
additional tool for evaluating commercial offers for sale under
§ 102(b).
108 Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047-48 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (quoting Enercon GmbH v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
